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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Interface Between Maritime Law and Aviation Law
When Orville and Wilbur Wright experimented with designs for the
first aircraft, maritime law was already well-developed. Nonetheless, the
courts that assisted in the evolution of maritime law certainly did not
anticipate that maritime principles would be applied to aviation. Because
of the similar functions served by overseas air transportation and sea
transportation, however, it was inevitable that maritime law would be
applied to aviation issues.
The unanticipated interface between maritime and aviation law has
created practical problems in delineating the proper scope of coverage
between these two bodies of law. The solutions posed have created a
confusing and sometimes anachronistic morass of overlapping legal theo-
ries. The recent development of space travel law will certainly emphasize
the historical mismatch between these two areas of law. It remains ques-
tionable whether traditional maritime concepts should be applied to
space travel.
One area of confusion between maritime and aviation law concerns
the rights and liabilities that arise from aviation deaths on the seas.
Seven laws provide different remedies: the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA), state wrongful death statutes, the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA), the Jones Act, general maritime law, and the War-
saw Convention.
The following analysis will assist the practitioner presented with a
wrongful death claim that arises from an aviation accident on or over the
* I would like to acknowledge and to thank the valuable assistance of Cynthia Sham-
baugh, an associate with Fisher & Hurst, in the preparation of this article.
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seas. The analysis will aid the selection of the most appropriate law
under which to seek relief for an injured party. The analysis can be di-
vided into three steps. First, the practitioner must determine whether
the law of the United States or the law of a foreign nation will apply to
the wrongful death claim. Second, the practitioner must decide which
body of law of the applicable jurisdiction will apply to the claim. Third,
the practitioner must consider procedural factors and substantive rights
which flow from the applicable bodies of law. These procedural and sub-
stantive considerations will permit the practitioner to evaluate the man-
ner in which to frame the claim, to select the court in which to bring the
claim, to determine liability for the death, and to select the available
remedies.
B. The Development of the Death on the High Seas Act and Other
Maritime Remedies for Wrongful Death
In 1886 the United States Supreme Court held that United States
general maritime law did not provide a wrongful death claim for deaths
either on the high seas or on waters navigable from the sea.' Congress
did not fill this void in the law until 1920 when it enacted DOHSA,2
which provides a remedy for the wrongful death of any person that oc-
curs on the high seas. Also in 1920, Congress enacted the Jones Act to
create a cause of action against an employer for the wrongful death of a
"seaman," 3 which provides for recovery based on the status of the
decedent.4
Thus, by 1920 a wrongful death claim existed for seamen on any
body of water in the United States and for all decedents on the high seas.
Several gaps, however, remained in the statutory scheme for wrongful
deaths at sea. They consisted of: (1) non-seamen killed in the territorial
waters of the United States not part of the high seas; and (2) maritime
employees who were not seamen under the Jones Act, but who worked
on board ships and on docks.
With respect to the first gap, the 1970 Supreme Court decision in
Moragne v. States Marine Lines5 created a cause of action based on gen-
1. The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
2. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (Supp. III 1985).
3. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1985).
4. If the seaman decedent is a foreign national and not a permanent resident of the
United States, the situs of the death makes a difference under the Jones Act. The foreign
seaman will not have a Jones Act remedy for death in the territorial waters of the United
States and the waters of the Outer Continental Shelf. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(b)(1) (Supp. III
1985).
5. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
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eral maritime law for decedents who did not have the status of seamen
and whose deaths occurred within the territorial waters of the United
States. Congress closed the second gap in 1927 by enacting the Long-
shore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA).6  The
LHWCA created a cause of action that was limited by situs to the "navi-
gable waters of the United States" and to various onshore locations "cus-
tomarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or
building a vessel." 7 OCSLA,8 enacted in 1953, extended the application
of the compensation provisions of LHWCA to workers on permanent or
temporary "artificial islands" 9 affixed to the Outer Continental Shelf,
even though these structures may technically be on the high seas.
The applicability of LHWCA and DOHSA overlap to some extent,
inasmuch as the navigable waters of the United States occasionally ex-
tend beyond the marine league limit of DOHSA jurisdiction.10 In addi-
tion, while it has been generally held that DOHSA applies exclusively to
deaths that occur on the high seas beyond the territorial waters of the
United States,11 LHWCA has been applied in a case in which a ship
sailed between United States ports, but was on the high seas at the time
the death occurred. 2
The extent to which the application of DOHSA overlapped state
wrongful death remedies created problems until the recent decision in
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire1 3 Due to the peculiar wording of
DOHSA section 767,14 lower courts were divided on whether state
wrongful death statutes could be applied concurrently with and supple-
mentarily to DOHSA.1 The courts which held state remedies could
6. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). In deference to the changing composi-
tion of the United States labor force, Congress, in 1984, changed the term "Longshoremen" to
read "Longshore and Harbor Workers." 33 U.S.C. § 901 (Supp. III 1985).
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 902-03 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
8. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
9. 43 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. III 1985); Chute v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 172 (D.
Mass. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 610 F.2d 7 (Ist Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936
(1980).
11. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986), on remand, 800 F.2d
1390 (5th Cir. 1986).
12. Cove Tankers Corp. v. United Ship Repair, Inc., 683 F.2d 38, 41-42 (2d Cir. 1982).
13. 106 S. Ct. at 2485.
14. The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or reme-
dies for death shall not be affected by this chapter. Nor shall this chapter apply to
the Great Lakes or to any waters within the territorial limits of any State, or to any
navigable waters in the Panama Canal Zone.
46 U.S.C. app. § 767 (Supp. III 1985).
15. See infra notes 143-157 and accompanying text.
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supplement DOHSA created an anomaly because state statutes were not
applicable to deaths that occurred within the territorial waters of the
United States, but state statutes did apply to deaths on the high seas. 6
Offshore Logistics settled the dispute in the circuits, holding that
DOHSA's jurisdiction preempts state laws.17
DOHSA's jurisdiction over deaths on the high seas is not absolute.
Seamen retain a Jones Act cause of action, 8 aircraft passengers on inter-
national flights have rights granted by the Warsaw Convention,' 9 mari-
time employees on artificial islands on the continental shelf retain
LHWCA actions by means of OCSLA,2° and suits against the United
States are governed by the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA)2' and the Pub-
lic Vessels Act.22 Nonetheless, as a general proposition, DOHSA is the
preeminent legal framework to be applied to deaths that occur on the
high seas.
C. DOSHA and General Maritime Law Provisions for Aviation
Deaths on the Seas
With regard to DOHSA jurisdiction for domestic transportation by
air, plaintiffs have brought causes of action for wrongful deaths under
DOHSA since the 1950s.z" DOHSA, however, is a maritime statute and
thus its application to aviation retains procedural and substantive fea-
tures unique to admiralty jurisdiction and maritime law.
Maritime law as developed by judicial decisions and statutes contin-
ues to control the rights and remedies that arise from aviation deaths on
the seas. While many aspects of DOHSA are no longer controversial, the
development of DOHSA and its application to new problems present the
practitioner with a confusing morass of DOHSA, general maritime law,
state law, Jones Act, LHWCA, OCSLA, SAA, and other principles.
The United States Supreme Court has striven to make recovery
under each of the various maritime theories uniform in terms of proce-
dural and substantive rights.24 Significant achievements have been made
to harmonize the available remedies. A recent example of the goal of
16. See, e.g., Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1983).
17. Offshore Logistics, 106 S. Ct. at 2485.
18. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
20. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
21. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52 (Supp. III 1985).
22. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-90 (Supp. III 1985).
23. See, e.g., Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
24. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. at 401, 407-408.
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uniformity is found in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire.25 Despite this
goal of uniformity, however, the law remains complex and confusing.
One example of the confusion that surrounds aviation deaths on the
seas stems from the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to the International Transportation by Air2 6 (Warsaw Conven-
tion), which regulates international air transportation. Recently, circuit
courts have interpreted article 17 of the Warsaw Convention as creating
an independent cause of action against an air carrier for wrongful death
that occurs while a passenger is embarking, disembarking, or on board
an aircraft.27 Prior to 1978, article 17 had been interpreted as merely
conditioning or limiting causes of action which had arisen under some
other body of law.28 The parameters of this new wrongful death cause of
action have not been defined yet. For instance, in In re Mexico City Air-
crash of October 3L 1979, the court refers practitioners seeking guidance
with respect to remedies under article 17 to DOHSA, the Jones Act,
LHWCA, and the decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines.29
II. FOREIGN LAW VERSUS UNITED STATES LAW
The threshold issue that confronts a practitioner is the determina-
tion of which law applies to a particular death on the high seas: foreign
law or United States law. Two distinct issues that concern the applicabil-
ity of foreign law must be addressed. First, the practitioner must deter-
mine whether foreign procedural or substantive law will apply to a claim
brought in the courts of the United States. Second, the practitioner must
determine whether jurisdiction over the action would be more appropri-
ate in the courts of a foreign nation.
A. Choice of Law-The Lauritzen and Rhoditis Test
Courts have interpreted section 764 of DOHSA to allow an alter-
nate body of foreign law to apply to a death that occurs on the high
seas.30 The courts do not, however, allow two separate causes of action
25. 106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986), on remand, 800 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1986).
26. Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C.
§ 1502 (Supp. 1982).
27. In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 415 (9th Cir. 1983);
Benjamins v. British European Airways, 72 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978), cerL denied, 439 U.S.
1114 (1979).
28. See Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d at 918-19.
29. In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d at 415.
30. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India, 531 F. Supp. 1175, 1185 (W.D. Wash.
1982); Bergeron v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N.V., 188 F. Supp. 594, 597
(S.D.N.Y. 1960), appeal dismissed, 299 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1962).
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for the same death, one under United States law and one under foreign
law.31
To determine whether foreign substantive or procedural law applies
to a wrongful death on the high seas, a choice of law test must be em-
ployed. The appropriate choice of law test has been developed in Laurit-
zen v. Larsen 32 and Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis.33 Lauritzen requires
the weighing of seven factors: the place of the wrongful act, the law of
the flag (i.e., the registry of the vessel), the allegiance or domicile of the
injured party, the allegiance of the defendant shipowner, the place of the
contract, the inaccessibility of the foreign forum, and the law of the fo-
rum itself.34 Rhoditis adds an eighth factor-the base of operations of
the ship and its owner.35
In balancing the seven factors, the law of the flag is accorded great
weight, unless the ship and its owner have an extensive base of operations
in the United States.36 Although the law of the flag factor, or any one of
the eight factors standing alone, is not sufficient to warrant the applica-
tion of foreign procedural or substantive law, courts have not hesitated to
apply foreign law when several factors together make it appropriate to do
SO.
3 7
Additionally, it should be noted that courts are hesitant to apply
United States law to claims that arise from accidents on drilling rigs lo-
cated on the high seas or in foreign waters.38 What the courts hold to be
most significant for those claims is the base of the day-to-day operations,
rather than the vessel owner's corporate base of operations.39
B. Forum Non Conveniens
The choice of law analysis outlined above is distinct from the analy-
31. Id.
32. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
33. 398 U.S. 306 (1970), reh'g denied, 400 U.S. 856 (1970).
34. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. at 583-92.
35. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 309.
36. Dalla v. Atlas Maritime Co., 562 F. Supp. 752, 755 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 771 F.2d
1277 (9th Cir. 1985); Rhoditis, 398 U.S. at 310.
37. See Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 496-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff'd, 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980).
38. Phillips v. Amoco Trinidad Oil Co., 632 F.2d 82, 84-88 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied
sub nom. Romilly v. Amoco Trinidad Oil Co., 451 U.S. 920 (1981).
39. Id. at 88; see also Sherrill v. Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling, 615 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D.
Cal. 1985); Chirinos de Alvarez v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 613 F.2d 1240, 1245-47 (3d Cir.
1980); Chiazor v. Transworld Drilling Co., 648 F.2d 1015, 1019 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied,
659 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1019 (1982).
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sis to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action." The anal-
yses, however, are closely related. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has stated, in dicta, that a choice of law determination must be made
before a court can dismiss a case under forum non conveniens.4'
To determine whether a cause of action should be dismissed for fo-
rum non conveniens, a court must make four distinct inquiries.4 2 First, it
considers whether an alternative forum exists which can exercise jurisdic-
tion over the entire case. If so, the court next weighs the strong pre-
sumption against disturbing a plaintiff's initial forum choice against all
relevant factors of private interest. Then, if the determination is roughly
equivalent with regard to the private interest factors, public interest fac-
tors which would tend to favor a foreign forum are investigated. If, fi-
nally, the court determines that the foreign forum would be a more
logical choice for the venue of the action, the court then must ensure that
the plaintiff can reinstate the suit in the foreign forum without undue
inconvenience or prejudice. Defendants often have to stipulate to waive
any statute of limitation bar and to submit to jurisdiction in the alternate
forum as a condition to a forum non conveniens dismissal.43
Courts have applied forum non conveniens to actions brought under
DOHSA 4 and under the Jones Act,45 although some earlier courts re-
fused to applyforum non conveniens principles to DOHSA and Jones Act
claims.46 Furthermore, the presence of United States plaintiffs has not
barred forum non conveniens dismissal in aviation or maritime cases.4 7
40. Cruz v. Maritime Co. of Philippines, 702 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1983).
41. Pereira v. Utah Transport, Inc., 764 F.2d 686, 688 (9th Cir. 1985), cert dismissed, 106
S. Ct. 1253 (1986).
42. Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784-85 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
43. Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 503-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) aff'd,
633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980).
44. Ying Shiue Jyu Fen v. Sanko Kisen (USA) Corp., 441 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
45. Sherrill v. Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling, 615 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
46. Cruz v. Maritime Co. of Philippines, 702 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1985).
47. See Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1983); Sherrill v. Brinkerhoff
Maritime Drilling, 615 F. Supp. at 1035.
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III. APPLICATION OF UNITED STATES LAW: DEATH
ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT, STATE LAW, GENERAL
MARITIME LAW, THE JONES ACT, THE LONGSHORE
AND HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT, THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT, AND THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
Once the threshold issue has been determined in favor of applying
United States law in a United States forum, the practitioner must then
determine which United States law applies to the action. Discussed be-
low is a comparison of the application of the seven different laws that
may apply to wrongful death actions. This comparison is analyzed in
terms of the situs of the wrongful death and the status of the decedent.
A. DOHSA
1. The Situs Requirement--One Marine League
The primary factor that determines whether DOHSA applies to a
claim is the situs of the death. DOHSA applies to the "death of a person
•.. caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the high seas
beyond a marine league from the shore of any State, or the District of
Columbia, or the Territories or dependencies of the United States."48 A
marine league is equivalent to three nautical miles or 3.5 statute miles.4 9
There is general agreement that a marine league is measured from a
state's shoreline and not from the boundary of a state's territorial waters.
Thus, DOHSA will apply to any portion of the territorial waters that lie
beyond one marine league from shore.5" This demarcation for DOHSA
jurisdiction does not change the actual boundaries of a state's territorial
waters. 1
48. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (Supp. III 1985).
49. Chute v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 172 (D. Mass. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 610
F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980). A nautical mile is 6080 feet; a statu-
tory mile is 5280 feet. WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1382 (3rd ed.
1969).
50. Brons v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 627 F. Supp. 230, 232 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (the Gulf of
Mexico beyond a marine league from the shore of Florida is the high seas for the purposes of
DOHSA, although it generally is considered to be the territorial waters of Florida); Chute v.
U.S., 449 F. Supp. at 175 (Nantucket Sound is within the jurisdiction of DOHSA if beyond a
marine league from shore, even if declared by Massachusetts to be territorial waters).
51. Practitioners faced with an accident in an area where the delineation of a state's terri-
torial waters closely, but not exactly, corresponds to the marine league boundary, or where
bodies of water such as coastal bays or inlets are involved, may wish to refer to the opinion in
United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965), reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 899 (1965), for a
discussion of the various points of view on this issue, and the Convention on the Territorial Sea
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One exception to the application of DOHSA to a death on the high
seas is when a death occurs on or adjacent to a fixed platform on the
Outer Continental Shelf. In such situations, when the action is against
the decedent's employer, OCSLA will be applied exclusively. 2
There is some doubt whether DOHSA will apply to territorial or
inland waters of foreign nations. While the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, in dicta, has "hesitated" to state that the territorial waters of Oki-
nawa are under the jurisdiction of DOHSA, 3 other courts have held that
foreign waters satisfy DOHSA's marine league requirement54 and have
applied DOHSA to a foreign state's inland river waters.55
What happens when an aircraft is lost at sea without direct evidence
of whether the crash occurred within or beyond the one marine league
jurisdictional boundary? Assuming the absence of circumstantial evi-
dence relative to the altitude, heading, and position of the aircraft, and
the nature of the cause of the crash, it is suggested that the issue of juris-
diction will be determined by an inference drawn from whether the air-
craft was bound toward or away from shore. Assuming no other
evidence upon which an inference may be drawn regarding the situs of an
aircraft crash, an aircraft which was last seen departing from shore
should be presumed to have crashed within the state's territorial waters,
whereas an aircraft which is last seen departing from a location beyond
the marine league boundary should be presumed to have crashed beyond
that boundary. Of course, the closer the point of departure or the last
sighting of an aircraft is to the marine league boundary, the less justifica-
tion there is to apply such an inference. 6
In the federal courts, the burden of proving federal jurisdiction is on
and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516
U.N.T.S. 205.
52. See infra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
53. Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1070 (1974). Roberts is clearly a minority view and does not specifically hold DOHSA inappli-
cable to foreign territorial waters; but see S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH
§ 1.17, at 47 (2d ed. 1975 & Supp. 1985).
54. In re Air Crash Disaster Near Bombay, India, 531 F. Supp. 1175, 1182-83 (W.D.
Wash. 1982); Mancuso v. Kimex, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 453, 455 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
55. Cormier v. Williams/Sedco/Horn Constructors, 460 F. Supp. 1010, 1012 (E.D. La.
1978).
56. For example, when it is known that a single engine aircraft is heading to shore and
reports an engine out at 12,000 feet above mean sea level (MSL) and 4 nautical miles from
shore, a reasonable inference to be drawn from the manufacturer's stated gliding performance
could be that the aircraft crashed at a location within one marine league of the shoreline and
outside the jurisdiction of DOHSA.
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the party who claims such jurisdiction 7.5  Thus, in cases in which the
situs of the crash is uncertain, the plaintiff must establish that the crash
occurred beyond one marine league from shore, unless the case is in the
federal court on defendant's removal petition.58
When the action is brought in state court, state wrongful death law
usually applies unless the defendant establishes DOHSA jurisdiction. In
addition, when jurisdiction is uncertain, state courts tend to apply the
law that is most familiar to the court and also tend to apply the more
liberal remedies that are generally available under state law.
2. No Nexus Requirement for DOHSA Jurisdiction
The Court in Executive Jet Aviation v. Cleveland" held that the
traditional test of the locality of an accident is insufficient to determine
whether the general maritime common law will apply to an aviation acci-
dent. The Court formulated a two-part test, containing a locality re-
quirement and a nexus requirement that the aircraft's flight bears "a
significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.",60
The Court advanced three policy reasons to justify the additional
requirement of a nexus test. First, the Court noted that many matters of
importance in maritime law have no bearing on aviation law.6' Second,
while aircrafts operate over both land and water, it makes little sense to
distinguish the applicability of state and federal procedural and substan-
tive law based upon the topography over which an aircraft flew at the
time of death.62 Third, the Court rejected the idea that the application of
maritime law should depend on where the wreckage is found. 63
It is important to note that, contrary to the interpretation of Execu-
tive Jet in more recent authority, 64 Executive Jet addressed general mari-
57. Subject matter jurisdiction must appear on the face of the complaint. FED. R. Civ. P.
8(a)(1).
58. The defendant is entitled to have the case removed to federal court if the plaintiff has
artfully pled a federal claim as a state claim. Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394, 397 n.2 (1981); Illinois v. Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp., 677 F.2d 571, 575 (7th Cir.
1982).
59. 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
60. Id. at 268. For a discussion of aviation activities that have been held to have a signifi-
cant relationship to traditional maritime activity, see Annotation, What Constitutes Significant
Relationship to Traditional Maritime Activity to Support Federal Court's Admiralty Jurisdiction
in Aviation Tort Cases, 30 A.L.R. FED. 759 (1976); 7A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE .330(3) (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1985-86).
61. Executive Jet, 409 U.S. at 270.
62. Id. at 265-66.
63. Id. at 266.
64. See Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 495-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
aff'd, 633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980).
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time law jurisdiction, and not DOHSA jurisdiction.65 Executive Jet
specifically excluded DOHSA from its holding: "Of course, under the
Death on the High Seas Act, a wrongful death action arising out of an
airplane crash on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of
a State may clearly be brought in a federal admiralty court.",66
DOHSA's independence from the Executive Jet nexus test is further
substantiated in Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire:
Here, admiralty jurisdiction is expressly provided under DOHSA
because the accidental deaths occurred beyond a marine league from
shore. See 46 U.S.C. section 761. Even without this statutory provision,
admiralty jurisdiction is appropriately invoked here under traditional
principles because the accident occurred on the high seas and in fur-
therance of an activity bearing a significant relationship to a tradi-
tional maritime activity. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of
Cleveland.67
Thus, Executive Jet's two-part situs/nexus test must be limited to its
facts. Accordingly, the test should apply solely to aviation accidents that
occur on a state's territorial waters within the marine league boundary.
Another case, Offshore Logistics, implies that the situs/nexus test will
apply to high seas claims which do not invoke DOHSA. DOHSA's juris-
diction over the high seas, however, is exclusive, and Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham 68 precludes application of a general maritime Moragne ac-
tion on the high seas. As a result, it is questionable if general maritime
law could ever be applied to aviation accidents on the high seas.
3. Application of DOHSA to Aviation Accidents
Because DOHSA's marine league boundary limit is based on mari-
time law, the limit refers to the perpendicular plane and is most applica-
ble to the navigation of ships on the high seas. Nonetheless, DOHSA also
applies to the vertical plane and to aircraft flying over the high seas.69
Courts have recognized the analogy between navigation by ships on the
high seas and navigation by aircraft in the airspace above the high seas.70
An aircraft need not crash into the sea for DOHSA to apply, nor
65. In re Aircrash Disaster Near Bombay, India, 531 F. Supp. 1175, 1184 (W.D. Wash.
1980).
66. Executive Jet Aviation v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 271 n.20 (1972).
67. 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2493 (1986), on remand, 800 F.2d 1390 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis
added).
68. 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
69. Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
70. Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 874, 875-76 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
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must the death occur in the water.71 Recently, for example, a court ap-
plied DOHSA to the Korean Air Lines flight 007 disaster, when most, if
not all, of the deaths occurred when the Soviet missile struck the aircraft
in midair.72
B. The Relationship between State Law and DOHSA
There are several areas of state law that may apply to deaths which
occur on the seas. A state's wrongful death statute is perhaps the most
significant area of state law applicable to deaths that occur on the waters
beyond the state's shore. But some states do not allow the extension of
wrongful death statutes for actions, such as unseaworthiness, that arise
on their offshore territorial waters.73 The lack of such a cause of action
in Florida led the Moragne court to establish a general maritime cause of
action for wrongful death.74 As shown below, this type of wrongful
death action must be brought in federal court.75 States that do extend
their wrongful death statutes out to the three-mile limit give a plaintiff
the choice of suing in state court under the state's wrongful death statute
or in federal court under general maritime law.7 6
Before the Supreme Court's Offshore Logistics decision, the circuit
courts were split in their willingness to apply state wrongful death stat-
utes to deaths that occur on the high seas.77 This split was due largely to
the significant disparity in relief available between DOHSA and state
wrongful death statutes.78 While state statutes may permit the recovery
of non-pecuniary damages, recovery under DOHSA is limited to pecuni-
71. D'Aleman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 259 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1958);
Notarian v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. at 877; Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447, 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F.
Supp. 929, 931 (D. Del. 1962); Noel v. Airponents, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 348, 350 (D.N.J. 1958);
Noel v. Linea Aeropostalz Venezolana, 154 F. Supp. 162, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), aff'd on other
grounds, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 907 (1957).
72. Hendrie v. Korean Air Lines, No. C-84-5413 TEH (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 1984) (order
denying remand).
73. Green v. Ross, 481 F.2d 102 103-04 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068
(1973); see also Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 397 (1970).
74. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 375.
75. See infra notes 143-157 and accompanying text.
76. State wrongful death statutes are preempted by the wrongful death action established
in the Moragne decision, when the action is in the federal court in admiralty. Nelson v. United
States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980).
77. See Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2492 (1986), on remand 800
F.2d 1390 (5th Cir. 1986).
78. See infra notes 238-295 and accompanying text.
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ary losses.79 After Offshore Logistics, state remedies are inapplicable in a
DOHSA action, regardless of whether the action is brought in federal or
state court.80
Other state laws may have limited application to DOHSA and other
maritime claims. State workers' compensation laws may apply to claims
against employers for employees who die on the high seas.81 A dece-
dent's pain and suffering prior to death is recoverable under a Jones
Act82 claim and under general maritime law"3 if the state in question
allows for that type of recovery. The Court in Offshore Logistics did not
address the issue of recovery for decedent's pain and suffering under
DOHSA. 4 State law may also apply to maritime claims if the state law
neither conflicts with federal law nor interferes with the characteristic
features or interests of general maritime law.85 Finally, state law be-
comes surrogate federal law in OCSLA claims when the state law is con-
sistent with federal law.8
6
C. General Maritime Law Under Moragne v. States Marine Lines
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, the Supreme Court created a
general maritime claim for deaths that occur "in situations not covered
by [DOHSA]."8 7 The Court's subsequent decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higgenbotham clarified that a general maritime law claim applies only to
the territorial waters of the United States and not to the high seas."8 A
general maritime law wrongful death claim, therefore, will lie for deaths
that occur both on inland waters 9 and on offshore waters up to the
79. The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary
loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought and shall be appor-
tioned among them by the court in proportion to the loss they may severally have
suffered by reason of the death of the person by whose representative the suit is
brought.
46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (Supp. III 1985).
80. Offshore Logistics, 800 F.2d at 1390-91.
81. See King v. Pan American World Airways, 270 F.2d 355, 364 (9th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 928 (1960).
82. See infra notes 242-243 and accompanying text.
83. Id.
84. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
85. Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); see also Sherrill
v. Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling, 615 F. Supp. 1021, 1036-37 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (applying a
California statute regarding good faith settlement in a Jones Act case).
86. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(2)(A) (1982); Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S.
352 (1969).
87. 398 U.S. 375, 402 (1970).
88. 436 U.S. 618, 625 (1978).
89. Kaiser v. Traveler's Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 90, 94 (E.D. La. 1973).
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three-mile limit. Moreover, in addition to its application to traditional
maritime activities, a Moragne cause of action will lie for an aviation
death which otherwise satisfies the situs requirement discussed above.90
The Court in Moragne further determined that a federal claim
would exist for unseaworthiness of a vessel or negligent violation of mari-
time duties,91 claims which are also available under DOHSA. An action
under the general maritime law, developed by Moragne, incorporates
many elements of traditional maritime law, such as the doctrine of laches
which governs the period within which a claim must be brought,92 the
prohibition against a trial by jury,9 3 and contributory negligence.94 In
addition, a federal court whose admiralty jurisdiction has been invoked is
not bound necessarily by common law,95 but may look to principles of
equity and justice.96
D. The Jones Act
The Jones Act provides a cause of action for injuries or wrongful
death against the employer of a "seaman" acting within the course and
scope of employment.97 The key factor that determines the application
of the Jones Act to a wrongful death action is not where the injury or
death occurs, but rather, the scope of the term "seaman." The require-
ments for seaman's status are: (1) a more or less permanent connection
with (2) a vessel in navigation, and (3) duties performed which contribute
to the function of the vessel, the accomplishment of its mission, or its
operation or welfare.98
Seaman status does not depend upon formal hiring arrangements.99
Nor is it necessary to receive compensation in order to acquire status as a
seaman. 'o Moreover, the lack of a long continued attachment to a vessel
will not preclude seaman status when the injury or death occurs in the
90. Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1070 (1974).
91. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409.
92. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 662 F.2d 251, 252-53 (4th Cir. 1981).
93. Green v. Ross, 481 F.2d at 102-03 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973).
94. Greene v. Vantage S.S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 163 (4th Cir. 1972).
95. Nice v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 305 F. Supp. 1167, 1171 (W.D. Mich. 1969).
96. United States v. Motor Vessel Gopher State, 472 F. Supp. 556, 559 (E.D. Mo. 1979),
aff'd, remanded, 614 F.2d 1186 (8th Cir. 1980).
97. 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (Supp. III 1985).
98. Guidry v. South Louisiana Contractors, Inc., 614 F.2d 447, 452 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g
denied, 616 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1980).
99. See Brooke v. Dennis, 1974 A.M.C. 664, 669 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
100. Id.; Gorgas v. Williams, 1976 A.M.C. 2387, 2395 (D.N.J. 1976).
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performance of traditional seaman's duties.10 1
Under the borrowed servant doctrine,1 °2 an injured employee may
show that he or she was the defendant's borrowed servant if the
employee establishes that the defendant had the power to control and
direct the employee's work.' 03 The borrowed servant doctrine is also
recognized under LHWCA °4 and under general maritime law.105
A Jones Act claim will arise typically in an aviation accident which
involves the transport of seamen by air, usually to and from an offshore
drilling platform considered to be a vessel. 116 Under the Act, an em-
ployer is liable for the negligence of its independent contractors engaged
in the transportation of the employer's employees. 0 7 Jones Act employ-
ers, therefore, can be liable for an air charterer's negligence in transport-
ing workers to and from a vessel or a floating drilling rig. The
jurisdiction of the Jones Act under these circumstances requires that the
floating rig be classified as a vessel.'08
Movable drilling rigs and barges are considered to be vessels, while
floating docks, work platforms, and work floats are not. 109 If there is no
exposure to the perils of the sea, a seaplane is not a vessel and its pilot is
not a seaman."X0
101. In re Read, 224 F. Supp. 241, 246 (S.D. Fla. 1963).
102. "The borrowed servant doctrine is a functional rule that places the risk of a worker's
injury on his actual rather than his nominal employer. It permits the injured worker to re-
cover from the company that was actually directing his work." Baker v. Raymond Int'l, Inc.,
656 F.2d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982).
103. Id.; Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 224 (5th Cir. 1975).
104. West v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 558 F. Supp. 669, 671-72 (E.D. La. 1983); Gaudett v.
Exxon Corp., 562 F.2d 351, 356 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g denied sub noa. St. Pierre v. Exxon
Corp., 565 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
105. United States v. Bissett-Berman Corp., 481 F.2d 764, 772 (9th Cir. 1973).
106. Sherrill v. Brinkerhoff Maritime Drilling, 615 F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
107. Hopson v. Texaco, Inc., 383 U.S. 262, 263 (1966) (shipowner liable for negligence of
cab driver transporting ill seamen to hospital).
108. See E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS
§ 96.04 (3d ed. 1977).
109. See Buna v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1360, 1364 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Berfect v. American Commercial Barge Lines, 509 F. Supp. 734, 735-36 (E.D. La. 1981);
Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 643, 646-47 (1st Cir. 1973), reh'g denied, 483 F.2d
963 (1st Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 856 (1973).
110. Smith v. Pan Air Corp., 684 F.2d 1102, 1112-13 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Hark v.
Antilles Airboats, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 683, 685 (D.V.I. 1973) (amphibian plane has a maritime
nexus when not airborne). But see Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 1199,
1206-07 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 692 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982), rehg denied, 698 F.2d 1216 (5th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983) (helicopter with floats designed to land, take off,
float, and taxi on the water is not a vessel under the Jones Act); Reeves v. Offshore Logistics,
Inc., 720 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1983).
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E. The Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
LHWCA protects employees who work near navigable waters, who
prior to 1927 did not have the status of seamen under the Jones Act, and
who are unprotected by state workers' compensation programs. I l' As is
common to most compensation schemes, LHWCA was a compromise:
Employees received no-fault compensation for injuries or death and em-
ployers were granted immunity from tort liability to employees."12
The decedent's status as an employee restricts the scope of
LHWCA, while the decedent's status in a DOHSA claim is immaterial.
Application of LHWCA is further limited by a situs test. The accident
which causes the injury or death must occur on navigable waters of the
United States or on adjacent lands.1 '3 Because navigable waters occasion-
ally extend beyond DOHSA's one marine league limit, there is some
overlap in the applicability of DOHSA and LHWCA. In addition, under
OCLSA, the remedies provided by LHWCA extend to fixed platforms on
the Outer Continental Shelf.'14
In actions by longshore or harbor workers against shipowners, a
claim based on unseaworthiness has not been permitted since LHWCA
was amended in 1972.1 The 1972 amendments, interpreted in Hillier v.
Southern Towing Co.,116 substituted negligence for unseaworthiness as
the standard of liability. Negligence suits under section 905(b) of
LHWCA are permitted against a vessel owner, except when the vessel
owner is also the employer. 117 The employer can only be liable for statu-
tory compensation under section 905(a)."'
In negligence actions against a shipowner, the owner is not liable for
an independent contractor's negligence absent a contract provision or
custom, if the dangers are unknown to the shipowner and concern mat-
111. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). LHWCA and OCSLA
may be applicable to aviation accidents when workers are being transported by aircraft over
the high seas to and from ships or drilling platforms, whether temporary or permanent. For a
discussion of the scope of the LHWCA and its relationship to state compensation systems, see
M. SPANSEL & J. GUILBEAU, VII THE RISK REPORT, A LOOK AT THE LONGSHORE AND
HARBOR WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT, No. 7 (MAR. 1985).
112. For a detailed discussion of the recent changes in LHWCA, see Davies, A Survey of
Maritime Tort Exposure for Personal Injuries After the 1984 Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Amendments, 3 INS. COUNS. J. 433 (1985).
113. 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. III 1985).
114. See infra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
115. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (Supp. III 1985).
116. 714 F.2d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 1983).
117. Buna v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 1360, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
118. See Baker v. Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., 451 F. Supp. 84, 93-94 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
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ters about which the owner had no duty to inform himself.119 This con-
trasts with the Jones Act practice in which the independent contractor's
negligence is generally attributable to the employer.120
F. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
OCSLA applies to actions by workers engaged in mineral explora-
tion for injury or wrongful death that occurs on any temporary or per-
manent structure located on the Outer Continental Shelf' 21 Application
of OCSLA is limited to the situs of the structure and to its immediately
adjacent waters.22 OCSLA defines the Outer Continental Shelf as:
[A]ll submerged lands lying seaward and outside of the area of
lands beneath navigable waters as defined in section 1301 of this title,
[i.e. the beds of streams constituting a part of the public lands of the
United States,] and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to the
United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control.1 23
When an OCSLA action is against an employer, compensation is
determined by LHWCA remedies. 24 For all other claims, the applicable
law and remedies are those of the adjacent state, to the extent such laws
are consistent with federal law.125
As discussed previously, the waters over the Outer Continental Shelf
beyond a marine league from shore are considered to be the high seas and
are under the jurisdiction of DOHSA. But when a death occurs on or
adjacent to an artificial island, even in the high seas, OCSLA rather than
DOHSA provides the remedy.12 6 When OCSLA provides the remedy,
OCSLA is considered to be exclusive of general maritime law or
DOHSA.127 Moreover, OCSLA includes the remedies provided by
LHWCA, rather than the Jones Act, because recovery under the Jones
119. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 166-67 (1981) (owner
of ship not liable for cargo operations of stevedore); see also Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715
F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1983); Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 622 F.2d 29, 31 (2d
Cir. 1980).
120. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
121. See generally 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
122. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331(a), 1333(a)(1) (1982); see infra note 126 and accompanying text.
123. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1301 (1982).
124. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (Supp. III 1985).
125. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(A) (1982); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
126. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969) (death on barge
adjacent to island; death from fall off derrick above island, onto island); Gulf Offshore Co. v.
Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473 (1981).
127. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. 2485 (1986).
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Act and LHWCA is mutually exclusive.12
G. The Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention (Convention) governs the rights of passen-
gers against air carriers for accidents that arise in international air trans-
portation between nations that are parties to the Convention. While the
Convention only applies to international transportation, the domestic
portion of an international "single operation" is also governed by the
Convention. 129
As mentioned in the Introduction to this Article, until 1978 courts
held that the Convention did not provide a separate cause of action for
wrongful death. Courts then held that the provisions of article 17 of the
Convention modify an existing cause of action for wrongful death that
stems from a separate body of law.130 Although there are no decisions
directly on point, 3 ' it would seem that the Convention, as an interna-
tional treaty, supersedes inconsistent provisions of DOHSA, the Jones
Act, and other maritime law.' 32 Thus, the Convention's separate cause
of action for wrongful death in an international aviation incident would
supersede all national remedies.
IV. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
After examining the basic differences in the application of these vari-
ous bodies of law, the next area for consideration is the different proce-
dural aspects of these laws.
A. Statute of Limitation
DOHSA provides a three-year statute of limitation.133 When a
DOHSA claim is brought against the United States, however, the three-
128. See Holland v. Allied Structural Steel Co., 539 F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir. 1976), reh'g
denied, 542 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105 (1977).
129. Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 181 Misc. 963, 43 N.Y.S.2d 420, 422 (1943),
aff'd, 267 App. Div. 947, 48 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1944), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E.2d 785 (1944),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 882 (1945). See generally Hernandez v. Aeronaves de Mexico, 18 Av.
Cas. (CCH) 18,227 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (if one party does not consider the transportation to be a
single operation, but rather two domestic flights, the Warsaw Convention does not apply).
130. See In re Mexico City Aircrash of October 31, 1979, 708 F.2d 400, 415 (9th Cir.
1983); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
131. But see Borham v. Pan Am, 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,236 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Warsaw
Convention statute of limitation applied in lieu of state statute of limitation).
132. See David & Lawrence, Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention and the Death on
the High Seas Act-Is there a Choice?, 3 INS. COUNS. J. 425, 431-32 (1985).
133. 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a (Supp. III 1985).
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year statute is superseded by the two-year limitation period provided by
the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA)."'
As originally drafted, section 763 of DOHSA provided a two-year
statute of limitation.135 In 1980 the United States Senate extended this
period to three years to conform with the three-year statute of limitation
under the Jones Act.136 The Jones Act incorporates the three-year limi-
tation period found in the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA).137
The Warsaw Convention is a treaty, although it has never been rati-
fied by the United States Senate. 138 Given its treaty status, the two-year
statute of limitation provided by article 29 of the Convention arguably
should be applied in lieu of the three-year DOHSA statute.
139
LHWCA provides a one-year statute of limitation."4 Actions
under OCSLA are governed by the limitation period provided by the
adjacent state's law.14
The specific statute of limitation period that DOHSA provides
should be distinguished from the statute of limitation provisions of gen-
eral maritime common law. Under admiralty jurisdiction, the equitable
doctrine of laches may be employed to determine if a claim was filed in a
timely manner. 142
B. Federal Versus State Court Jurisdiction
The federal courts, when presented with a claim based solely on gen-
eral maritime common law, have original and exclusive jurisdiction,
which preempts state court jurisdiction. 143 Thus, a Moragne action can-
not be brought in the state courts unless joined with a state law claim.
Under the savings to suitors clause,'" a plaintiff may choose to bring an
134. 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (Supp. III 1985); Miller v. United States, 725 F.2d 1311, 1315
(lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
135. 46 U.S.C. § 763 (1920).
136. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 763a (Supp. III 1985).
137. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982).
138. See I. SPIESER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW §§ 11:4-11:5 (1978 & Supp.
1986).
139. See Borham v. Pan Am, 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,236 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (Warsaw Con-
vention statute of limitation applied in lieu of state statute of limitation).
140. 33 U.S.C. § 913(a) (1982).
141. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 98 (1971).
142. Hill v. W. Bruns & Co., 498 F.2d 565, 568 (2d Cir. 1974).
143. 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982).
144. Judiciary Act of 1948, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) (1982). The savings to suitors clause af-
fords maritime litigants the option to pursue available common law remedies in lieu of reme-
dies available in admiralty. Stainless Steel & Metal Mfg. Corp. v. Sacal V.I., Inc., 452 F. Supp.
1073 (D.P.R. 1978); Pacific Far East Line, Inc. v. Ogden Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1239 (N.D. Cal.
1977).
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action for death on the territorial waters in state court, when the state
wrongful death statute permits such a claim. 45
The Jones Act provides for an action "for damages at law," and
therefore is not within admiralty jurisdiction. 14 6 Thus, jurisdiction under
the Jones Act is concurrent in federal and state court. 147
Prior to Offshore Logistics, there was a significant split in authority
whether DOHSA claims were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts, or whether state courts had concurrent jurisdiction over
DOHSA claims. The majority view was that DOHSA, being a maritime
statute, was within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts. The opposing view was based on an interpretation of the savings
to suitors provision in section 767.148 The Court in Offshore Logistics
resolved the split in the courts by interpreting section 767 as aprocedural
savings to suitors clause.' 49 This interpretation was based on 28 U.S.C.
section 1333(1), which permits common law actions that supplement
maritime law to be brought in state courts.
The decision in Offshore Logistics goes beyond the savings to suitors
clause in 28 U.S.C. section 1333(1), however. While the maritime cause
145. J. MOORE, supra note 60, .210.
146. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (Supp. III 1985).
147. Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 243 (1942).
148. For a discussion of the diversity of opinions that existed prior to the decision in Off-
shore Logistics, see Brown, Is the Death on the High Seas Act Jetsam or Flotsam: State and
Federal Wrongful Death Statutes Collide Over the High Seas, 11 TORT & INS. L.J. 296 (1986);
Edelman, The Tallentire Case: The Fifth Circuit Extends Recoveries for Death on The High
Seas, 11 TORT & INS. L.J. 375 (1986). At the heart of the dispute was the ambiguous language
in § 767 of DOHSA:
The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or reme-
dies for death shall not be affected by this chapter. Nor shall this chapter apply to
the Great Lakes or to any waters within the territorial limits of any State, or to any
navigable waters in the Panama Canal Zone.
46 U.S.C. app. § 767 (Supp. III 1985).
Several courts held that § 767 did not apply to the procedural determination of exclusive
versus concurrent jurisdiction over a DOHSA claim, but rather section 767 applied to whether
state substantive law on wrongful death was saved to suitors and was to be applied concur-
rently with the DOHSA provisions to deaths that occurred on the high seas. Alexander v.
United Technologies Corp., 548 F. Supp. 139, 141-42 (D. Conn. 1982); Safir v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 241 F. Supp. 501, 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). Similarly, some courts
held that while state substantive law would not apply, state remedies for wrongful death could
supplement remedies provided by DOHSA. Sierra v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 107 F.
Supp. 519, 521 (D.P.R. 1952).
The opposite position was that DOHSA granted the exclusive substantive rights and rem-
edies to plaintiffs for deaths on the high seas. Thus, DOHSA preempted state wrongful death
statutes. This view had greater support. Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 80
(9th Cir. 1983); Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 90 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
149. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2495 (1986).
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of action for wrongful death under DOHSA is held to preempt state sub-
stantive wrongful death statutes, it is also held to be under the concur-
rent jurisdiction of the state courts.1 50 Thus, the traditional rule that
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over maritime actions is abro-
gated because "the resolution of DOHSA claims does not normally re-
quire the expertise that admiralty courts bring to bear" and "the
availability of concurrent jurisdiction prevents disunity in the provision
of forums to survivors of those killed on the high seas."15 1
Another jurisdictional issue is the potential for removal. Until 1986
removal jurisdiction in the federal court was derivative. Thus, a claim
could only be removed if the court in which it initially was filed had
original jurisdiction.1 5 2 Consequently, an action based solely on general
maritime common law filed originally in state court could not be re-
moved to federal court, and had to be dismissed. On June 19, 1986, Con-
gress amended the U.S. Code to allow federal courts to hear civil actions
which had been removed from state courts, but over which the state
courts did not have jurisdiction. 53
An action brought in state court under the savings to suitors clause
based on state wrongful death remedies may, of course, be removed when
there is a basis for federal jurisdiction other than admiralty (e.g., diver-
sity or federal question). 154 In this context, the jurisdiction of the federal
courts over maritime claims is not considered to be federal question
jurisdiction. 155
Following Offshore Logistics, removal of a DOHSA claim to federal
court can be accomplished under 28 U.S.C. section 1441(b). Removal
does not apply to claims under the Jones Act, because of sections 45 and
56 of FELA. 56 Claims brought under LHWCA and OCSLA, however,
are removable.1 57
150. Id. at 2500.
151. Id.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982); Devlin v. Flying Tiger Lines, Inc., 220 F. Supp. 924, 925
(S.D.N.Y. 1963) (citing Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943)).
153. "The court to which such civil action is removed is not precluded from hearing and
determining any claim in such civil action because the State court from which such civil action
is removed did not have jurisdiction over that claim." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(e) (West Supp.
1986) as amended by Pub. L. No. 99-336 (1986).
154. J. MOORE, supra note 60, % .210.
155. Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 368 (1959); Puerto Rico v.
Sea-Land Service Inc., 349 F. Supp. 964, 975 (D.P.R. 1970).
156. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (Supp. III 1985). See Stokes v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 577 F.
Supp. 9, 11 (D. Pa. 1983); cf. Beckwith v. American President Lines, Ltd., 68 F. Supp. 353,
354 (N.D. Cal. 1946).
157. 33 U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. III 1985); Lowe v. Ingalls Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173 (5th
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C. Venue
There is no venue requirement for admiralty or maritime claims.
Instead, personal jurisdiction and venue analyses merge, so that venue is
proper in any district in which valid service of process is made on the
defendant or attachment against the defendant's property may be ob-
tained."5 8 An exception exists for claims against the United States. A
claim against a United States vessel must be brought in the district in
which the vessel is located. 15 9 The district court may, however, decide to
transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. section 1404(a). Section 1404(a) grants a
district court discretion to transfer any civil action for the "convenience
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." It applies to admi-
ralty actions. 160
Suits brought under DOHSA, the Jones Act, or LHWCA in the
state courts are, of course, subject to state venue requirements. Inasmuch
as such actions involve offshore accidents, forum non conveniens princi-
ples, as applied to maritime claims, will influence the determination of
the appropriate venue. 6'
D. Jury Versus Court Trial
Certain procedural doctrines found in admiralty jurisdiction follow
traditional rights in equity jurisdiction. One of the most significant pro-
cedural doctrines is the absence of the right to a jury trial in a maritime
case. 162 Because DOHSA contains no provision for a right to a jury trial,
the general maritime rule of no trial by jury applies.' 63 In addition, a
claim against the United States under SAA is by statute a nonjury pro-
ceeding.16 In contrast, the Jones Act provides for a jury trial.'65
Cir. 1984). Unlike the Jones Act, there is no provision in either LHWCA or OCSLA that
prohibits removal. Therefore, the recently amended 28 U.S.C. section 1441(e) allows for the
removal of claims brought under LHWCA and OCSLA.
158. Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. J.E. Bernard & Co., 508 F. Supp. 907, 909 (N.D. Ill.
1981); Gipromer v. S.S. Tempo, 487 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Pardonnet v. Flying Tiger
Line, 233 F. Supp. 683, 688 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
159. Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 782 (Supp. III 1985). See, e.g., Sherman v.
United States, 246 F. Supp. 547 (W.D. Mich. 1965); Rogue v. United States, 227 F. Supp. 178
(D.P.R. 1964).
160. Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Brown, 348 F.2d 689, 691 (10th Cir. 1965); Brown v. Blidberg
Rothchild Co., 222 F. Supp. 18 (D. Del. 1963).
161. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
162. Green v. Ross, 481 F.2d 102, 103 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973).
163. First National Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 288 F.2d 621, 623-24 (2d Cir. 1961),
cert. denied sub nom. Kessler v. National Airlines, Inc., 368 U.S. 859 (1961).
164. 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 (Supp. III 1985).
165. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (Supp. III 1985).
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The doctrine against trial by jury has been relaxed in cases in which
the United States is not a defendant. A jury trial is permitted when the
plaintiff has joined at-law causes of action, such as a Jones Act claim or a
claim for decedent's pain and suffering prior to death,166 with a DOHSA
claim. 167 Following the same principle, if a Jones Act claim is joined
with a general maritime law claim, the case will be tried by a jury. A
jury may also be requested when a maritime claim is brought at law
based on diversity of citizenship.
168
Because a DOHSA claim may now be brought in the state courts, it
remains to be seen whether the state courts will drop the traditional ad-
miralty rule and follow their own procedural rules to permit a jury trial
in actions brought under DOHSA alone. The Offshore Logistics opinion
has suggested the use of a jury trial by noting that an admiralty court's
expertise is not necessary to resolve a DOHSA claim.69
E. Claim Against the United States: SAA
When an action is brought against the United States based on either
DOHSA or general maritime law, the case must be brought in the federal
courts under SAA.170 If the case involves United States-owned ships, the
claim must be brought under the Public Vessels Act. 7'
Section 742 of SAA provides the parameters under which the
United States consents to the maritime jurisdiction of the courts: "In
cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such
cargo were privately owned or possessed, or if a private person or prop-
erty were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be maintained, any
appropriate nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought against the
United States.' 1 72 The application of SAA to an action against the
United States is mandated by section 2680(d) of the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), 173 which exempts from the FTCA "any claim for which a
166. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
167. Peace v. Fidalgo Island Packing Co., 419 F.2d 371 (9th Cir. 1969).
168. See e.g., Anderson v. American Oil Co. of Baltimore, 60 F.R.D. 676 (S.D. Ga. 1973).
169. Offshore Logistics v. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2495 (1986).
170. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52 (Supp. III 1985).
171. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-790 (Supp. III 1985); Miller v. United States, 725 F.2d at 1311,
1313 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d
893, 896-97 (9th Cir. 1983); Ashland v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 711 F.2d 1431, 1435 n.3
(9th Cir. 1983); Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 526 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1070, (1974); Chute v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 172, 175 (D. Mass. 1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 610 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 936 (1980); Kropp v. Douglas
Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447, 455 (E.D.N.Y 1971).
172. 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 (Supp. III 1985).
173. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1982).
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remedy is provided by sections 741-52, 781-90 of Title 46, relating to
claims or suits in admiralty against the United States." If a claim does
not have a situs which allows for the application of DOHSA, the applica-
tion of SAA or FTCA to a claim against the United States may depend
upon the nexus test established in Executive Jet.17 4
There are several significant procedural aspects to suits under SAA.
SAA provides for a two-year statute of limitation.1 75 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that a third-party complaint against the
United States must be brought within the specified two-year period from
the date of the accident. 176 There is no requirement that an administra-
tive claim be filed within a certain period of time, unlike the provisions
found in FTCA. 177 The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.17 8
The complaint must refer to SAA 179 and must name the United States,
rather than an agency of the government, as the defendant.180 Service by
registered mail on the United States Attorney General must be under-
taken "forthwith" after the filing of the action.' A delay in service be-
yond the limitation period may result in dismissal of the action.' 2
Unlike FTCA, the action cannot be brought against individuals em-
ployed by the United States.8 3 As is the case with admiralty and mari-
time claims, a defendant by third-party practice can require a third-party
defendant to respond to the plaintiff's complaint.' 84
V. CLAIMS AND REMEDIES
In the following discussion, substantive provisions of DOHSA will
be contrasted primarily with the Jones Act and general maritime law
with respect to the nature of the claim and the remedies available for
174. Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972). The few cases which
indicate that death on the high seas actions against the United States may be brought under
FTCA appear to be anomalies. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 439 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), aff'd, 306 F.2d 16 (3d Cir. 1962); Kunkel v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 591, 594
(S.D. Cal. 1956).
175. 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (Supp. III 1985).
176. H-10 Water Taxi Co. v. United States, 379 F.2d 963, 964- 65 (9th Cir. 1967).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1982); see also Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d 893, 895 (9th
Cir. 1983).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(d) (1982); 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 (Supp. III 1985).
179. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
180. Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d at 897-98.
181. 46 U.S.C. app. § 742 (Supp. III 1985); Ashland v. Ling-Tempco-Vought, Inc., 711
F.2d at 1431, 1436 (9th Cir. 1983).
182. Id.; Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d at 898.
183. 46 U.S.C. app. § 745 (Supp. III 1985); Cusanelli v. Klaver, 698 F.2d 82 (2d Cir.
1983).
184. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(c).
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aviation deaths on the seas. Due to the complexity and specificity of the
statutory provisions of LHWCA and OCSLA, the practitioner is best
guided by direct reference to those statutory schemes.
A. Proper Parties
1. Decedents
The status of a decedent is immaterial under DOHSA and general
maritime law. The other legal remedies for wrongful death claims, dis-
cussed above, require that the decedent be either an employee injured in
the course and scope of employment (Jones Act, LHWCA, OCSLA) or a
passenger on board an aircraft (Warsaw Convention).
It should be noted that Congress amended the Jones Act on Decem-
ber 29, 1982, to bar most foreign nationals employed in offshore indus-
tries from maintaining an action under the Act or under other United
States maritime laws.185
2. Beneficiaries
Section 761 of DOHSA specifies those beneficiaries who may bring a
claim for wrongful death. The class of beneficiaries is limited to "the
decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative." 18 6 De-
pendency must be shown if the beneficiary is not the spouse, parent, or
child of the decedent.1 87 Illegitimate children can recover for the death
of their parents. 188 Finally, a widow(er)'s remarriage is not considered in
the determination of the plaintiff's status as a beneficiary. 8 9 DOHSA's
classification of beneficiaries has been adopted by the courts for the gen-
eral maritime wrongful death action as developed in Moragne.1 90
Distinguished from DOHSA, the Jones Act (which mirrors FELA)
categorizes potential beneficiaries into successive classes. Recovery by
any person within a preceding class prohibits recovery by members of
succeeding classes. The Jones Act classes are: "for the benefit of the
surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none,
then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin
185. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(b) (Supp. III 1985).
186. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (Supp. III 1985).
187. First National Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 288 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1961).
188. Middleton v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293
U.S. 577 (1934).
189. Blumenthal v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 439, 449 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd, 306 F.2d
16 (3d Cir. 1962).
190. In re Cambria S.S. Co., 353 F. Supp. 691, 697 (N.D. Ohio 1973), aff'd, 505 F.2d 517
(6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub nom. Gordon v. Dahl, 420 U.S. 975 (1975).
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dependent upon such employee." 191 For example, if a decedent is sur-
vived by a nondependent child, a dependent parent cannot recover under
the Jones Act, although the parent could recover under DOHSA. 192
3. Defendants
A claim under DOHSA may be brought against "the vessel, person,
or corporation which would have been liable if death had not ensued."' 193
The availability of the claim against the vessel is based on the maritime
claim of a libel in rem.194 Because the action is maritime in nature, the
Moragne general maritime claim may also be brought against a vessel.
As will be discussed below, there is no comparable provision for a suit
against the vessel in rem under the Jones Act.195
When the United States is the defendant under DOHSA, the case is
in admiralty and is not considered at law because the United States has
consented to jurisdiction in admiralty only under SAA.196 SAA permits
suits against the United States, not against federal agencies or individual
federal employees. 197
B. Causes of Action
1. DOHSA
a. Negligence, Breach of Contract, and Strict Liability
In addition to negligence, DOHSA permits a wrongful death action
based on non-negligent breach of implied warranty in maritime contracts
and on a strict products liability theory. 198 The standard for strict liabil-
ity is the same as that provided in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 199
The doctrine of implied warranty is held to be applicable in mari-
time actions because it has been accepted widely as a theory of recovery
191. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982).
192. Whitaker v. Blidberg-Rothchild Co., 195 F. Supp. 420, 421 (E.D. Va. 1961), aff'd,
296 F.2d 554 (4th Cir. 1961).
193. 46 U.S.C. app. § 761 (Supp. III 1985).
194. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Vessel Bay Ridge, 703 F.2d 381 (9th Cir. 1983).
195. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (Supp. III 1985).
196. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 741-52 (Supp. III 1985); Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520,
525-26 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
197. Williams v. United States, 711 F.2d 893, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1983).
198. Fosen v. United Technologies Corp., 484 F. Supp. 490, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd,
633 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1980); Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 635
(8th Cir. 1972), on remand, 352 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 1288 (8th Cir.
1973); Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447, 455 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
199. McCune v. F. Alioto Fish Co., 597 F.2d 1244, 1252 (9th Cir. 1979).
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in air disasters that occur over land.2 "' Some courts, however, have held
that breach of warranty actions are not cognizable under general mari-
time law.2°'
b. Unseaworthiness (Unairworthiness)
A DOHSA action may include a cause of action under general mari-
time law for unseaworthiness. °2 Unseaworthiness refers to a condition
of a vessel or its gear, crew, or appurtenances which renders the vessel
unsuitable or unfit to be used for the purpose intended. 20 3 The duty of a
shipowner or operator to maintain the vessel in seaworthy condition is
nondelegable, and liability for the breach of this duty is not dependent
upon negligence or knowledge of the unseaworthy condition.204 Unsea-
worthiness includes employment of an incompetent crew,205 but a single
act of crew negligence is not considered to be unseaworthiness. °6
Unseaworthiness relates to aviation claims in at least two respects.
First, by analogy to appurtenances to a vessel which assist in the means
of ingress and egress, it may be possible to posit liability for unseaworthi-
ness in connection with air transportation to or from a vessel. For exam-
ple, a helicopter permanently assigned to a movable drilling rig (which
may be considered a vessel),207 that is piloted by an incompetent crew or
has some defect in design or manufacture, may give rise to a claim for
unseaworthiness. The court in Hebert v. Air Logistics, Inc.,208 however,
held that an independently contracted helicopter was not an appurte-
nance to a barge. The court based its opinion on Garrett v. United States
Lines, Inc.,20 9 which held that independently contracted launches not
permanently assigned to a vessel that are used to ferry workers to and
200. Krause v. Sud-Aviation, 301 F. Supp. 513, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 413 F.2d 428
(2d Cir. 1969).
201. Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 316 F.2d 758, 766 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 940 (1963); Best v. Honeywell, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 269, 271-72 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd sub
nom. Best v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., 679 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981); Jennings v. Goodyear Air-
craft Corp., 227 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D. Del. 1964).
202. Chermesino v. Vessel Judith Lee Rose, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 36, 39 (D. Mass. 1963),
aff'd, 317 F.2d 927 (Ist Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 931 (1963).
203. E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 108, § 96.13.
204. Id.
205. Lemar Towing Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 352 F. Supp. 652, 661 (E.D. La.
1972), aff'd, 471 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1973), reh'g denied, 478 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
206. Campbell v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 581 F.2d 98, 99 (5th Cir. 1978).
207. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text.
208. 720 F.2d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 1983).
209. 574 F.2d 997, 999 (9th Cir. 1978).
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from the mother ship are not considered to be appurtenances to the
mother ship.
Another means by which unseaworthiness may relate to aviation is
the extension of the doctrine of unseaworthiness to include unairworthi-
ness. One court has applied the concept of unairworthiness (based on
incompetence of the copilot) to the crash of a commercial passenger
flight on the high seas in the Gulf of Mexico when no seagoing vessel was
involved.21° It should be noted, however, that the district court's opinion
does not present an analysis of this issue, and the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals' opinion does not discuss the issue because it was not raised on
appeal.
Vessel owners faced with a claim for unseaworthiness (or negli-
gence) may bring a proceeding in admiralty to limit their liability or ex-
onerate themselves from liability when they have no knowledge of the
unseaworthiness (or negligence) or privity on which liability can be
based.21' When an owner can establish the absence of such knowledge or
privity, liability is limited to the value of the vessel and its freight "then
pending" if it is not a "seagoing vessel. ' 212 If a seagoing vessel is in-
volved, liability for death or bodily injury is extended to 420 dollars per
ton of the vessel's weight. 3
With the extension of the doctrine of unseaworthiness to aviation,
the owner of an aircraft charged with liability based on unairworthiness
should be entitled to the limitation or exoneration from liability afforded
by 46 U.S.C. section 183. When an aircraft crashes on the high seas, the
value of the aircraft "then pending" is nil. The Merchant Marine and
Fisheries Committee of the House of Representatives, however, is con-
sidering legislation that proposes to raise liability limits significantly in
cases of death or personal injury. 4
c. Peculiar Risk of Harm
The "peculiar risk of harm" doctrine may be the basis for a cause of
action under DOHSA. The doctrine, based on the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, provides that one who employs an independent contractor to do
210. Stiles v. National Airlines, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 125, 131 (E.D. La. 1958), aff'd, 268
F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959).
211. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183(a) (Supp. III 1985).
212. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183(a), (f) (Supp. III 1985).
213. 46 U.S.C. app. § 183(b) (Supp. III 1985).
214. H.R. 277, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced Jan. 3, 1985); H.R. 3157, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (introduced Aug. 1, 1985). It is unlikely that such legislation will be
enacted in the session of Congress pending at the time of this writing, but the legislation may
be reintroduced.
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work which the employer should recognize as likely to create a peculiar,
unreasonable risk of physical harm to others unless special precautions
are taken is subject to liability in the absence of such precautions. 21s If
the decedent is a seaman, the applicability of such vicarious liability is
governed by Nelson v. United States.2 16 Nelson held that an employer is
not liable for injuries to the contractor's employees under the peculiar
risk of harm doctrine if: the contractor is solvent; the contractor is as
competent and informed as the owner about the particular safety risks;
and the owner is not significantly involved in safety aspects of the job or
does not act to aggravate the dangers of the job. 17
2. The Jones Act
Under the Jones Act only claims based upon negligence, and not
unseaworthiness, are actionable. This statutory limitation raises the po-
tentially anomalous situation of a seaman having no claim for unseawor-
thiness if killed on state territorial waters, but having an unseaworthiness
claim under DOHSA if killed on the high seas. To partially alleviate this
anomoly, the Moragne court ruled that a cause of action based either on
unseaworthiness or negligence is available under general maritime law
for wrongful death.218
Although the issue of negligence under the Jones Act is usually a
question of fact, one Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision affirmed a
directed verdict for a defendant based on the absence of evidence of negli-
gence. 219 The standards of negligence and causation are more relaxed
under the Jones Act than in a land-based negligence action.2 20 The negli-
gence need not be a proximate cause or a substantial factor in bringing
about the injury. Liability will be imposed if the negligence contributes
in some degree to the injury, no matter how "small" or "slight. ' 221 This
contrasts with the cause of action for unseaworthiness, in which the sub-
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413, 416 (1965).
216. 639 F.2d 469, 479 (9th Cir. 1980).
217. If the claim comes under LHWCA, the employer is not liable under the peculiar risk
of harm doctrine because the 1972 amendments to LHWCA eliminate the shipowner's vicari-
ous liability (for the acts of the stevedore). Teofflovich v. D'Amico Mediterranean/Pacific
Line, 415 F. Supp. 732, 734-35 (C.D. Cal. 1976). Apparently there are no cases addressing the
use of the peculiar risk of harm doctrine with OCSLA.
218. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 402 (1970).
219. Hawley v. Alaska S.S. Co., 236 F.2d 307, 311 (9th Cir. 1956).
220. See T. WYLLIE & D. ROUEN, VI THE RISK REPORT, A REVIEW OF MARITIME LAW
AND RELATED RISKS, No. 9 (May 1984).
221. Litherland v. Petrolane Offshore Constr. Serv. Inc., 546 F.2d 129, 131-32 (5th Cir.
1977); Ayala v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 263, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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stantial factor test is the standard for determining causation.2 2 2
C. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which permits an inference of neg-
ligence to be drawn from unexplained events, may apply to aviation acci-
dents controlled by maritime law.22 3
Application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in aviation maritime
cases requires the plaintiff to establish the traditional prerequisites: an
event which (1) usually does not occur in the absence of someone's negli-
gence; (2) is caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive
control of the defendant (or multiple defendants); and (3) is not contrib-
uted to by the plaintiff.224 Practitioners relying on the doctrine, however,
should be mindful that the application of the doctrine does not require
judgment for the plaintiff and appellate review is not de novo.2 25
A plaintiff faced with a mysterious disappearance case who cannot
establish all the prerequisites to application of the res ipsa loquitur doc-
trine may have recourse by analogy to maritime principles. One general
maritime case has permitted an inference of proximate causation from
the existence of an unseaworthy condition of a vessel. 226 An aviation
case decided under DOHSA held that a prima facie case of strict liability
in tort was stated when plaintiff could demonstrate that the aircraft crash
was caused by some unspecified defect.2 27
222. See E. DEvITr & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 108, § 96.22. But cf Milos v. Sea-Land
Service, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980).
223. Ashland v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 711 F.2d 1431, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1983) (disap-
pearance of Air Force C-135 over the high seas in which cause of the accident remained a
mystery); Trihey v. Transocean Air Lines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1958), cert
denied, 358 U.S. 838 (1958) (disappearance of commercial passenger flight over the high seas,
cause unknown; plaintiff introduced evidence regarding crew fatigue, faulty maintenance of
auto pilot and engine, poor qualifications of copilot, and lack of airworthiness). Note that the
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Ashland included application against the United
States in an action under SAA.
224. Ashland v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 711 F.2d at 1437.
225. Trihey v. Transocean Airlines, Inc., 255 F.2d at 827.
226. See In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied sub
nom. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Marine Sulphur Transp. Corp., 409 U.S. 982 (1972); see
also Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d 631, 639-40 (8th Cir. 1972).
227. Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Corp., 460 F.2d at 640; see also North Amer-
ican Aviation v. Hughes, 247 F.2d 517 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 914 (1958), a non-
maritime aviation case that affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff in which the plaintiff produced
evidence of a manufacturing defect in the aircraft, but provided no evidence that such defect
proximately caused the crash.
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D. Comparative or Contributory Negligence
The decedent's contributory negligence does not bar recovery under
DOHSA228 or the Jones Act,22 9 but the degree of negligence attributable
to the decedent proportionately reduces the recovery. Contributory neg-
ligence is an affirmative defense in maritime actions, and therefore, it
must be pleaded and proved by the defendant.23 Comparative negli-
gence has become so accepted in maritime law that it is even applied in
maritime products liability actions.231
E. Indemnity Between and Among Defendants
Maritime law traditionally provided that a passively or secondarily
liable tortfeasor, absent contractually created liability, would be entitled
to total indemnification from a joint tortfeasor who was actively or pri-
marily liable for death or injury.232 Recently, however, some courts have
substituted indemnification based on apportionment of fault in the place
of all or nothing indemnity based on the active-passive distinction, when
the conduct of each tortfeasor contributed to personal injury governed by
maritime law. 33
Assuming the trend is toward indemnification based on apportion-
ment of fault in maritime death cases, a question arises regarding the
continuing vitality of all or nothing indemnification. The court in Loose
v. Offshore Navigation, Inc. 234 indicated that implied indemnity (as well
as contractual indemnity) may supplement principles of comparative in-
demnity. Accordingly, total indemnity would likely be applied in cases in
which liability is imposed on a defendant solely on the basis of vicarious
liability or liability imposed under law without fault (e.g., master-ser-
vant, owner-contractor, etc.), with comparative indemnity being applied
in other cases. California law provided such a scheme until recently.
The California courts now have held that the concept of total implied
228. 46 U.S.C. app. § 766 (Supp III. 1985).
229. E. DEvrrr & C. BLACKMAR, supra note 108, §§ 96.27, 94.18.
230. Greene v. Vantage S.S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 163 (9th Cir. 1972).
231. National Marine Serv. Inc. v. Petroleum Serv. Corp., 736 F.2d 272, 276 (5th Cir.
1984).
232. See, e.g., Barrios v. Louisiana Constr. Materials Co., 465 F.2d 1157, 1166-67 (5th Cir.
1972).
233. Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 500-02 (5th Cir. 1982); Kizer v.
Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 489 F. Supp. 835, 83741 (N.D. Cal. 1980). But see Ebanks v. Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 688 F.2d 716, 722 (11th Cir. 1982), reh'g denied, 693 F.2d 135
(1 lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1083 (1983) (court indicates that comparative contribu-
tion would be appropriate in a Jones Act case, but the jury could not compare the fault of the
defendant to that of a non-party).
234. 670 F.2d at 502 n.18 (5th Cir. 1982).
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indemnity has been superseded by comparative indemnity in all cases
except for indemnity obligations under contract.235
Special rules control indemnity in LHWCA actions. The exclusivity
of the Act's liability provisions preclude a third party from obtaining
contribution under state law from an employer who has paid benefits
under the Act.236 Under section 905(b), a LHWCA employer is not lia-
ble for direct or indirect damages to a vessel, and any agreement or war-
ranty to the contrary is void. Note, however, that the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals has on occasion recognized a limited exception when
the shipowner seeks indemnity from the stevedore employer based on
breach of the "implied warranty of workmanlike service. 237
F. Damages
1. Survival Action for Pain and Suffering
Section 765 of DOHSA provides for the survival of a claim when
death occurs while a case is pending in an admiralty court. In such cir-
cumstances, the personal representative of the deceased may be substi-
tuted as a party, and the suit may proceed under DOHSA.2 38
Prior to Offshore Logistics, it was clear that actions based on state
law to recover for the pain and suffering of the deceased could be brought
concurrently with a claim for wrongful death under DOHSA. 239 These
earlier courts based these decisions on the philosophy that the courts
may fill gaps in the law which have not been addressed by Congress. 240
The propriety of allowing such concurrent causes of action was
questioned by the Supreme Court in Offshore Logistics. The Court, how-
235. Compare E. L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, 21 Cal.3d 497, 506-10, 146
Cal. Rptr. 614, 619-22 (1978), Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 542, 203 Cal.
Rptr. 47, 51 (1984), with IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 108-09, 224 Cal. Rptr.
438, 446 (1986), and Standard Pacific of San Diego v. A. A. Baxter Corp., 176 Cal. App. 3d
577, 592, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106, 115 (1986).
236. Graco, Inc. v. Colberg, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 322, 326-27, 208 Cal. Rptr. 465, 467-68
(1984), cert. denied sub nom. Earl's Pump & Supply Co. v. Colberg, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 69 (1985).
237. Hanseatische Reederei Emil Offen & Co. v. Marine Terminals Corp., 590 F.2d 778,
781 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. San Francisco Elevator Co., 512 F.2d 23, 26-27 (9th Cir.
1975); but cf. Davis v. Chas. Kurz & Co., 483 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1973); S.S. Seatrain
Louisiana ex rel. Tyler Tanker Corp. v. California Stevedore and Ballast Co., 424 F. Supp.
180, 183-85 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Schreefel v. Okuly, 143 Cal. App. 3d 818, 822, 192 Cal. Rptr.
402, 404 (1983) (interpreting federal law).
238. Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 792 n.20 (5th Cir. 1976), reh'g denied, 545 F.2d
1298 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. dismissed sub nom. Warren v. Serody, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
239. Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386, 1388-92 (3d Cir. 1971); In re Gulf
Oil Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911, 916-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
240. Chute v. United States, 466 F. Supp. 61, 69-70 (1978).
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ever, specifically declined to "address the issue whether the DOHSA re-
covery for the beneficiaries' pecuniary loss may be 'supplemented' by a
recovery for the decedent's pain and suffering before death under the
survival provision of some conceivably applicable state statute that is in-
tended to apply on the high seas." '241 The Court's language implies that
the treatment of concurrent claims may change in the future.
An action to recover for the decedent's pain and suffering may also
be brought under the Jones Act and under a general maritime claim for
wrongful death.242 A claim for the decedent's pain and suffering in a
DOHSA or Jones Act action is based solely on the availability of such a
remedy under state law.243 In contrast, the cause of action for wrongful
death under general maritime law includes a claim for pain and suffering
of the decedent without any reference to state law provisions for such
recovery.24
2. Pecuniary Loss
Perhaps the most significant aspect of DOHSA is the provision in
section 762 which provides:
The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for
the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is
brought and shall be apportioned among them by the court in propor-
tion to the loss they may severally have suffered by reason of the death
of the person by whose representative the suit is brought.245
The measure of such pecuniary loss has been defined as "reasonable ex-
pectation that such benefits would have accrued to the complainant from
the continued life of the decedent. '246 By incorporation of FELA, the
Jones Act likewise limits damages to pecuniary lOSS. 24 7
The potential amount of pecuniary loss recoverable by beneficiaries
under DOHSA is greater than merely the decedent's loss of earning ca-
pacity. Pecuniary loss under DOHSA includes loss of services, loss of
inheritance, loss of support, loss of nurture and guidance, and loss of
241. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 106 S. Ct. 2485, 2491 n.1 (1986); see generally
Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794, 797-98 (Ist Cir. 1974).
242. Thompson v. Offshore Co., 440 F. Supp. 752, 761 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
243. Whitaker v. Blidberg-Rothchild Co., 195 F. Supp. 420, 424 (E.D. Va. 1961).
244. Greene v. Vantage S.S. Corp., 466 F.2d 159, 167 (4th Cir. 1972); In re Farrell Lines,
Inc., 339 F. Supp. 91, 94 (E.D. La. 1971).
245. 46 U.S.C. app. § 762 (Supp. III 1985).
246. Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d at 1392 (quoting In re S.S. Black Guell,
90 F.2d 619, 620 (2d Cir. 1931) cert. denied, sub. nom. Faye v. American Diamond Lines, 302
U.S. 728 (1937)).
247. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a) (Supp. III 1985).
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education.24 8 Neither DOHSA nor the Jones Act, however, permits re-
covery for loss of the economic value of a decedent's life.249
Thus, courts have allowed parents to recover for the death of their
children in terms of loss of services and loss of support,25 0 but not for loss
of inheritance.2" 1 The courts have allowed children to recover for loss of
nurture and guidance, and for loss of education. 2 The death of a parent
alone, however, is not sufficient to allow for such recovery; the child
must also show that the decedent parent was fit to furnish such training
and guidance, and had actually done so while alive.253 The claim for loss
of parental guidance and training is not available after the child reaches
the age of majority.254 On the other hand, loss of a college education due
to the death of the decedent parent is recoverable.255
Under general maritime law, there is one additional category of re-
coverable pecuniary loss-loss of investment income.25 6 This loss will be
allowed if the decedent's intelligence and physical labor produced income
which may have generated investment income during the decedent's life-
time.25 7 While it is not clear whether the recovery for loss of investment
income is available under DOHSA or the Jones Act, it would appear that
it could be recovered under the loss of inheritance rubric.
The determination of whether recovery may be had under any of
these categories depends upon whether the beneficiary might reasonably
have expected to receive from the decedent certain benefits during the
decedent's lifetime.258 Factors to be considered include: the decedent's
age, health, and earning capacity; and the surviving beneficiary's age, life
expectancy, income, alternative means of support, health, financial con-
248. Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d at 1392-96; Moore-McCormack Lines,
Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583, 587-89 (2d Cir. 1961), cert denied, 368 U.S. 989 (1962); and
370 U.S. 937 (1962), reh'g denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962); In re Cambria S.S. Co., 353 F. Supp.
691, 697 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Mascuilli v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 439, 441-42 (E.D. Pa.
1972), rev'd on other grounds, 483 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1973); In re Farrell Lines, Inc., 339 F.
Supp. at 94.
249. In re Farrell Lines, Inc., 339 F. Supp. at 95.
250. Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d at 1393; In re Farrell Lines, Inc., 339 F.
Supp. at 94.
251. Thompson v. Offshore Co., 440 F. Supp. 752, 762-63 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
252. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d at 88.
253. Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 788 (5th Cir. 1976).
254. Id. at 789.
255. Id. at 789-90.
256. Mascuilli v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 439, 443 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
257. Id.
258. Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386, 1392 (3d Cir. 1971); Chute v.
United States, 466 F. Supp. 61, 65-66 (1978); Thompson v. Offshore Co., 440 F. Supp. 752, 762
(S.D. Tex. 1977).
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dition, and relationship to the decedent. While mathematical precision is
not required in calculating the amounts to be awarded to the benefi-
ciaries, the amounts may not be speculative.259
A useful method to analyze these factors in a specific case is to an-
swer the following series of questions. First, what are the beneficiaries'
ages, life expectancies, incomes, and alternative means of support? Sec-
ond, what annual sums would the decedent have contributed to the bene-
ficiaries during the future years of the decedent's life? Third, what other
future obligations would the decedent be expected to have? Fourth, what
is the amount of the beneficiaries' loss reduced to present value? Addi-
tional factors may be used to supplement this analysis.260
When a DOHSA claim is subject to the Warsaw Convention, pecu-
niary losses are limited to $75,000, a limit established by what is gener-
ally referred to as the Montreal Agreement. 261 This limit does not apply,
however, when the air carrier is guilty of "wilful misconduct." '262
3. Nonpecuniary Loss
The damages available under the general maritime cause of action
for wrongful death are much broader than the damages available under
DOHSA or the Jones Act. Subsequent to the Moragne opinion, the
Court in Sea-Land Services Inc. v. Gaudet263 dealt with an issue not de-
cided by Moragne: the types of damages available under the general mar-
itime wrongful death action. Following the public policy tradition of the
"humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty," the Gaudet
Court allowed, in addition to pecuniary damages, the recovery of nonpe-
cuniary damages for loss of society, love and affection, and for funeral
expenses. 2 4 Recovery under general maritime law, however, does not
259. Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d at 1392-93.
260. See id. at 1396.
261. Agreement Relating to Liability Limitations of the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol, Agreement CAB 18900, approved by order E-23680, May 13, 1966, Docket
17325, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. app. § 1502 (1981).
262. Warsaw Convention, supra note 26, art. 25(1). In November 1983, a bill was intro-
duced in Congress to amend the Federal Aviation Act to provide a compensation scheme for
victims of domestic commercial air accidents. The bill was put to an unsuccessful vote of the
House of Representatives. There are apparently no immediate plans to reintroduce the amend-
ments. H.R. 4479, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983) (introduced Nov. 18, 1983).
263. 414 U.S. 573 (1974), reh'g denied, 415 U.S. 986 (1974).
264. Id. at 587-88; see also American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 285-86
(1980); Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 591-92 (1974), reh'g denied, 415 U.S.
986 (1974); Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 79 (4th Cir. 1983); In re Farrell
Lines, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 91, 93-94 (E.D. La. 1971); In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F.
Supp. 652, 661 (E.D. La. 1971), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re S/S Helena, 529
F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1976).
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include grief and mental anguish suffered by the decedent's
beneficiaries.265
The recovery of nonpecuniary losses under general maritime law
highlights the many factors to consider when a party seeks a claim for
death on the seas. Faced with a borderline case concerning maritime
nexus and whether the death occurred inside or outside the marine
league boundary, the practitioner may wish to weigh the availability of
prejudgment interest under DOHSA,266 the recovery of nonpecuniary
damages under general maritime law, and the measure of damages avail-
able under state law. Of course, other factors need to be considered as
well, such as the applicable limitation period and whether a claim
against the United States should be brought as a DOHSA claim under
SAA or under FTCA.2 6 7
4. Funeral Expenses
Generally, funeral expenses are not considered a pecuniary loss
under DOHSA and thus are not recoverable.268 Similarly, funeral ex-
penses are not recoverable under the Jones Act because FELA, upon
which the Jones Act is based, does not allow for such recovery.2 69 Re-
covery for funeral expenses is allowed, however, under a general mari-
time claim for wrongful death.27°
One court has permitted recovery of funeral expenses in a DOHSA
action.271 That court, however, may have based its decision on the fact
that the surviving spouse paid the funeral expenses. If so, the court's
decision is consistent with the principle that recovery under DOHSA is
to benefit the beneficiaries and not the decedent's estate. 272 The cases
which have ruled that funeral expenses are not recoverable under
DOHSA have all involved claims on behalf of the decedent's estate.273
265. Greene v. Vantage S.S. Co., 466 F.2d 159, 168 (9th Cir. 1972); Thompson v. Offshore
Co., 440 F. Supp. 752, 765-66 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
266. See infra notes 274-277 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 133-142 and 170-184, and accompanying text.
268. Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794, 802 (1st Cir. 1974); In re The Culberson, 61 F.2d
194, 195-96 (3rd Cir. 1932).
269. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1982).
270. Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S. Corp., 453 F.2d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 948 (1972); Mascuilli v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 439, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1972); In re
Farrell Lines, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 91, 94-95 (E.D. La. 1971).
271. Moore v. The O/S Fram, 226 F. Supp. 816, 818 (S.D. Tex. 1963), affd sub nom.
Wilhelm Seafoods, Inc. v. Moore, 328 F.2d 868 (5th Cir. 1964).
272. Chute v. United States, 466 F. Supp. 61, 69 (1978).
273. Id.
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5. Prejudgment Interest
It is in the trial court's discretion to award prejudgment interest in a
maritime claim, and to award such interest at a rate lower than the legal
rate.274 Prejudgment interest is not permitted, however, when the United
States is the defendant in an action under SAA.27 5
When the action is subject to the Warsaw Convention, the courts
are divided whether the $75,000 limit on recovery established by the
Montreal Agreement includes the prejudgment interest portion of the
award. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that prejudgment
interest cannot be awarded if the total award exceeds the $75,000
limit.276 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held to the contrary.277
Interestingly, both circuits based their rulings on the perceived purpose
of the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal Agreement.
6. Punitive Damages
Punitive damages based on gross negligence, actual malice, or reck-
less conduct are recoverable in general maritime cases for unseaworthi-
ness 278 and for maintenance and cure.2 79 The law is unsettled regarding
the permissibility of punitive damages under the Jones Act, 280 and there
are no cases that adequately discuss whether punitive damages are avail-
274. Solomon v. Warren, 540 F.2d 777, 794 (5th Cir. 1976); Dennis v. Central Gulf S.S.
Corp., 453 F.2d at 141; Chute, 466 F. Supp. at 70; In re Farrell Lines, Inc., 339 F. Supp. at 95.
275. 46 U.S.C. app. § 782 (Supp. III 1985); Mascuilli v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 439,
443-44 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
276. O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 842, 853 (2d Cir. 1984).
277. Domangue v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 722 F.2d 256, 264 (5th Cir. 1984); Mahfoud v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 17 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,714, 17,717 (W.D. La. 1982), aff'd, 729 F.2d 777
(5th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 469 U.S. 84 (1984).
278. In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 105 (2d Cir. 1972); In re Merry Shipping,
Inc., 650 F.2d 622, 625-26 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied sub nom. Dyer v. Merry Shipping Co.,
659 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1981).
279. Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., 477 F.2d 1048, 1051-52 (1st Cir. 1973); see infra notes
287-296 and accompanying text for a definition of maintenance and cure; see also Waddell,
Punitive Damages in Admiralty, 21 ToRT & INS. L.J. 425, 431-32 (1986), for a more detailed
discussion of punitive damages in maintenance and cure cases.
280. In re Merry Shipping, Inc., 650 F.2d at 626; Baptiste v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App.
3d 87, 102-03, 164 Cal. Rptr. 789, 797-98 (1980), cert. denied sub nom. Chevron Shipping Co.
v. Baptiste, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981); Kopczynski v. The Jacqueline, 742 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1984);
cerL denied, 471 U.S. 1136 (1985). But see In re Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 276 F. Supp.
163, 176 (N.D. Ohio 1967), rev'd sub nom. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d
1143 (6th Cir. 1969), cerL denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970) (punitive damages awarded in a Jones
Act case, but holding was reversed because corporate owner of vessel was not liable for con-
duct of the master of the vessel unless the owner ratified the acts or was reckless in hiring an
unfit master); Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 449 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1971).
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able in a DOHSA claim.2 8 1
7. Attorney's Fees
The issue of whether attorney's fees are available for a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful death on the seas has not been litigated extensively.
Neither DOHSA2 8 2 nor the Jones Act 283 provides for an award of attor-
ney's fees. Attorney's fees specifically are allowed under LHWCA, how-
ever.2 84  Moreover, because OCSLA incorporates the compensation
provisions of LHWCA, attorney's fees may be recoverable in a cause of
action brought under this statute.285
An award for attorney's fees may be made by the admiralty court
under its equitable powers in an action by a seaman for "maintenance
and cure.",286 "Maintenance" refers to a seaman's subsistence during re-
covery from illness or injury, and "cure" refers to medical care and at-
tention. 287 "Maintenance and cure" is an implied or quasi-contractual
form of compensation under general maritime law to provide for a sea-
man who becomes ill while in the service of a vessel. 2 8 8
Although "maintenance and cure" is not awarded if a seaman
dies,289 it may be awarded if the decedent lived even one day.290 If a
seaman fails to receive "maintenance and cure," the seaman may make a
claim for reasonable attorney's fees incurred to obtain such recovery.2 9 1
The fact that a seaman is awarded more by a court for "maintenance and
cure" than what his employer had paid is insufficient to recover attor-
ney's fees.2 92 Instead, the test is whether the employer acted in bad faith,
or whether the employer's refusal to pay "maintenance and cure" was
callous, recalcitrant, or clearly unjustified.2 93 Thus, while an award of
281. Waddell, supra note 279, at 430.
282. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 761-68 (Supp. III 1985).
283. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (Supp. III 1985).
284. 33 U.S.C. app. § 928 (Supp. III 1982).
285. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
286. Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 530 (1962), reh'g denied, 370 U.S. 965 (1962).
287. Cox v. Dravo Corp., 517 F.2d 620, 623 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1020
(1975).
288. Evans v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 382 F.2d 637, 639 (4th Cir. 1967).
289. Daughdrill v. Diamond "M" Drilling Co., 305 F. Supp. 836, 839-40 (W.D. La. 1969),
rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 (1972).
290. Williamson v. Western-Pacific Dredging Corp., 304 F. Supp. 509, 516 (D. Or. 1969),
aff'd, 441 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971) (decedent who lived one
day was awarded medical expenses of $920.65).
291. Blanchard v. Cheramie, 485 F.2d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 1973).
292. Constance v. Johnston Drilling Co., 422 F.2d 369, 370 (5th Cir. 1970).
293. In re United States, 303 F. Supp. 1282, 1315 (E.D.N.C. 1969), aff'd sub nom In re
United States & Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 432 F.2d 1357 (4th Cir. 1970); see also Solet v. M/
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attorney's fees is given as a form of punitive damages, 294 if there is a bona
fide dispute regarding the seaman's entitlement to "maintenance and
cure," the employer will not be liable for attorney's fees.2 95
VI. CONCLUSION
The slow progress toward uniform laws applicable to aviation
deaths on the seas presents the practitioner with workable though some-
times confusing solutions. Moreover, the intricate relationships between
the various laws that govern aviation deaths on the seas make it difficult
for the practitioner to select the most appropriate cause of action. Unfor-
tunately, it is impossible to provide the practitioner with a chart from
which to steer a course to the correct solution in each case.
Even as familiarity with the various laws is achieved, a new focus is
placed on the mismatch between aviation and maritime law with the
prospect of wrongful death claims arising from accidents in space. Be-
cause a good argument can be made that the vestiges of admiralty juris-
diction no longer logically apply to aviation deaths even though they
occur on the high seas,29 6 the application of these principles to deaths
that occur in space becomes even more tenuous. Why, for example,
should the application of DOHSA depend upon whether the spacecraft
was above the high seas?297 Or, why should the application of general
maritime law depend on whether space travel can be characterized as
having a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity?
Aviation's advancement beyond the earth and into space suggests
the need to depart from the application of maritime law to aviation, and
to provide a uniform international convention akin to the Warsaw Con-
vention. Several international agreements have already been drafted that
deal with the assessment of liability and the distribution of damages that
V Capt. H. V. Dufrene, 303 F. Supp. 980, 989 (E.D. La. 1969) (attorney's fees awarded when
there was a "willful failure" to pay); Nice v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 305 F. Supp. 1167, 1175
(W.D. Mich. 1969) (attorney's fees awarded when employer was dilatory in investigating or
failed to investigate a claim for "maintenance and cure").
294. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, 313 & n.71f (2d ed. 1975).
295. Smith v. Dale Hart, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1164, 1169 (W.D. La. 1970).
296. J. MOORE, supra note 60, t .220[1], .220[2], .330[5].
297. The deaths of the astronauts in the 1986 Challenger shuttle disaster would probably
involve the application of DOHSA, because at the time of the explosion the shuttle was ap-
proximately ten miles above the high seas. The Challenger disaster also raises other jurisdic-
tional problems, such as the immunity of the United States under SAA and FTCA for the
deaths of the five crew members who were military or NASA employees, and the effect of the
Federal Employees' Compensation Act (5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-93 (1982)) on claims against the
United States brought on behalf of civilian crew members Christa McAuliffe and Gregory P.
Jarvis.
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arise out of space-related accidents. 298 An international convention
could clarify many potentially confusing issues, such as the law to be
applied to a particular claim. An international convention could also
provide for a uniform system of rights and remedies. In this fashion, a
death on the launch pad, such as the 1967 Apollo accident, or a death ten
miles into space over the high seas, such as the 1986 Challenger accident,
could be adjudicated in a consistent and equitable manner.
298. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T.
2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Re-
turn of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, done April 22, 1968,
19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; Convention on the International Liabil-
ity for Damage Caused by Space Objects, done March 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No.
7762; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, done Jan. 14, 1975,
28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480 (entered into force Sept. 15, 1976); Agreement Governing the
Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at
77, U.N. Doc. A/34/68 (1979).
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